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INTRODUCTION

The implied covenant of exploration is the most controversial of
the covenants that may be read into an oil and gas lease. Courts and
commentators disagree not only about the substance of the implied covenant, but also about the existence of the implied covenant of exploration independent from the implied covenant of development.
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In 1959, the Texas Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue in
Clifton v. Koontz.1 The court held that there was no implied covenant
of exploration in Texas as distinguished from the implied covenant of
development. This position was recently affirmed by the Texas Supreme
Court in Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Jackson.'
The Arkansas courts have similarly refused to recognize an implied covenant of exploration independent from the implied covenant of
development.' The implied covenant of development, however, is so
broadly defined in Arkansas that lessors are essentially entitled to the
protections of the implied covenant of exploration under the rubric of
the implied covenant of development.
This article will first review the rationale for implying covenants in
oil and gas leases. Then, the traditional definitions of, and distinctions
between, the implied covenant of exploration and the implied covenant
of development will be examined. Thereafter, the case law from Texas
and Arkansas will be reviewed and the law of the two states compared
and contrasted. The remedies available in implied covenant of exploration cases will be discussed, and finally, the effects of certain express
lease provisions upon the implied covenant of exploration will be
examined.

II.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF IMPLIED COVENANTS

Courts analyze implied covenants within the framework of three
fundamental issues. First, the courts determine the rationale for imposing obligations upon a lessee in instances where the lease is silent on
the subject. The courts and commentators have proposed several theories both for and against implying covenants in oil and gas leases. As a
result, both lessors and lessees involved in implied covenant litigation
can cite a variety of theories in favor of their respective positions.
Second, once an implied duty has been imposed on a lessee, the
courts will ascertain the test or standard of conduct that will be utilized
to determine if the implied duty has been breached by the lessee." The
generally accepted standard of conduct is that of a "reasonable prudent
operator." The reasonable prudent operator standard, however, is not
uniformly defined or applied by the courts.
1. 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
2. 783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1989).
3. See, e.g., Byrd v. Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
4. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 802 (1986).
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Third, courts and commentators have debated whether implied
covenants are "implied in law" or "implied in fact." This issue is relevant in the analysis of a variety of issues, including the analysis of
whether an express provision in an oil and gas lease supersedes an implied covenant on the same subject. 5
A.

The Rationale for Imposing Implied Covenants

Courts and commentators generally cite one or more of four rationales for implying covenants in oil and gas leases: (a) the nature of the
oil and gas lease due to the inability of lessor and lessee to predict
future events; (b) the contractual principle of cooperation; (c) the competing interests of lessor and lessee; and (d) public policy
considerations.
1.

The Nature of the Oil and Gas Lease

Courts have found it necessary to imply covenants into oil and gas
leases due to the fundamental uncertainties of the oil and gas business.
Lessors and lessees cannot predict whether or not their leases will result
in the discovery and production of hydrocarbons, and they cannot predict all of the technological, political, economic, and legal developments
that will be applicable to such production in the event it is obtained.
Due to this uncertainty, lessees are unwilling to commit in advance to
lease provisions that would set forth specific obligations regarding exploration, production, or development, and lessors are wary of leasehold
provisions that may unduly limit the lessee's future obligations. 6
As a result, leases are generally silent regarding many of the fundamental duties of the lessee and rights of the lessor. The doctrine of
implied covenants was developed in order to define those rights and
duties of the parties that were by necessity left out of the oil and gas
lease.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
6. There could not well have been an express stipulation as to the number of wells to
be drilled, as to when the wells, other than the first, should be drilled, or as to the rate
at which the production therefrom should proceed, because these matters would depend
in large measure upon future conditions, which could not be anticipated with certainty,
such as the extent to which oil and gas, one or both, could be produced from the premises . . . . The subject was, therefore, rationally left to the implication ....
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 810 (8th Cir. 1905). Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 567 (Tex. 1981); 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 802; 1 E.
SMITH & J. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS 241 (1989); Weaver, Implied Covenants in
Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1473, 1485 (1981).
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The Principle of Cooperation

Certain commentators have stated that the law of implied covenants is based upon the principle of cooperation that has been developed in the law of contracts. The principle of cooperation requires the
parties to a contract to cooperate for the purpose of carrying out the
objects of their agreement. The principle creates implied duties in contracts based upon the reasonable expectations of the parties and in or7
der that the purposes of their contracts may be achieved.
The principle of cooperation is said to be applicable to oil and gas
leases due to the fact that oil and gas leases typically cannot set forth
all obligations or rights of the lessor and lessee. Cooperation between
the parties is necessary to effectuate the unwritten intent of the oil and
gas lease, and the principle of cooperation will effectuate this intent by
implying conditions and covenants in the lease.'
3.

Competing Interests of Lessor and Lessee

Although the lessor and lessee to an oil and gas lease share a common interest in locating and producing hydrocarbons, conflicts of interest between the lessor and lessee are inevitable because of the cost factors involved in locating and producing hydrocarbons. 9 The potentially
greatest consideration that a lessor receives for an oil and gas lease is
the right to receive a royalty, which is an expense-free fractional share
of oil and gas production. Conversely, the lessee must bear all of the
cost of exploring, producing, operating, and developing the leased property. These different interests in the cost factors of the oil and gas lease
often result in conflicts over the pace of exploration and development
activity.10
4.

Public Policy Considerations

Some commentators have argued that covenants should be implied
7. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 802; Meyers, The Effect of Express
Provision in an Oil and Gas Lease on Implied Obligations, 14 INST. ON MIN. L. 90 (1967). But
see Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 INST. ON OIL AND GAS L. AND TAX'N 177, 195 (1976).
8. Meyers, supra note 7, at 91; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 802; Note,
Texas Oil and Gas Leases Contain Separate and Distinct Implied Covenant to Further Explore
After Lucrative Production, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 981, 985 (1989).
9. Weaver, supra note 6, at 1486.
10. Id. I E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 242; Bullock, Implied Obligations of Oil
and Gas Lessees, 1969 NAT'L INST. FOR PETROLEUM LANDMEN 127, 128.
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in oil and gas leases as a means of advancing certain public policy considerations. For example, Williams and Meyers have argued that the
implied covenant of exploration is supported by the "overall public policy of the national government . . . in favor of the development of new
domestic reserves of oil and gas, as is reflected in the percentage depletion allowance and the intangible drilling costs deduction." 1 The duty
of a lessee to develop the entire leased premises has also been described
as an application of the public policy against lessees holding nonproductive portions of productive leases for speculative purposes. 2
Other commentators have argued that public policy considerations
do not support the imposition of implied covenants in oil and gas leases.
For example, Professor Martin has argued that certain implied covenants result in the rapid depletion of reserves and the wasteful consumption of hydrocarbons, and defeat the public policy in favor of conservation of natural resources. 3 To this dialogue may be added the
observation of the court in Labbe v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.: "As parties bind themselves so shall they be bound. One of the basic public
policies of this State is the right of parties to contract and to have their
14
contracts enforced by the courts."
B.

The Reasonable Prudent Operator Standard

Regardless of the rationale utilized by a court for the implication
of covenants in oil and gas leases, the determination of whether the
lessee has performed an implied covenant must be measured under a
standard of performance. In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions,
the standard of performance for all purposes of an oil and gas lease is
the "reasonable prudent operator" standard.1 5 Recognition of this standard as the performance standard for all implied covenants has led
11. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, §§ 847, 802.3. But see Williams, Implied
Covenants for Development and Exploration in Oil and Gas Leases-the Determination of Profitability, 27 U. KAN. L. REV. 443, 453 (1979).
12. 5 E. KUNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 62.1 (1978); Meyers, supra
note 7, at 117; see also Meyers & Crafton, The Covenant of Further Exploration-Thirty Years
Later, 32 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 1-1, 1-20 (1986) (arguing that implied covenants are needed
to prevent opportunistic behavior by lessees under relational contracts); see also Mansfield Gas
Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 172, 133 S.W. 837, 839 (1911).
13. Martin, supra note 7, at 205-06; Weaver, supra note 6, at 1488; 1 E. SMITH & J.
WEAVER, supra note 6, at 246.
14. 350 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, §§ 801, 806.3; 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER,
supra note 6, at 244.
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some commentators to state that there is actually only one implied covenant: the implied covenant of prudent operation.16
The reasonable prudent operator standard was first articulated in
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co."7 In Brewster the plaintiff was the lessor
of an oil and gas lease that provided, among other things, for a fiveyear primary term. No wells were drilled prior to the fifth year of the
primary term. During the fifth year, an assignee of the original lessee
drilled a gas well on the lease. No further exploration or development
was conducted by the assignee. During the same period, many successful wells were drilled in the near vicinity. Sixteen months after the
completion of the well on plaintiff's lease, plaintiff filed suit for cancellation of the lease, alleging failure of development and breach of the
duty to protect against drainage. 8
The court in Brewster, applying Kansas law, held that the plaintiff
was entitled to terminate the lease due to the assignee's failure to exercise due diligence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Van Devanter set
forth the following standard of performance for a lessee under an oil
and gas lease: "Whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably
expected of operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee, is what is required."' 9
An essential element of the reasonable prudent operator standard
set forth in Brewster is that a lessee must do what is required of a
reasonable prudent operator "in the circumstances." 20 As a result, the
standard of the reasonable prudent operator varies from situation to
situation. For example, in Brewster, it was alleged that the lessee had
not adequately developed the leasehold or protected it against drainage.
In response, Judge Van Devanter stated that an operator need not develop the leasehold or protect it from drainage unless such an operation
would result in a profit to both the lessor and the lessee:
The large expense incident to the work of exploration and development, and the fact that the lessee must bear the loss if the operations
are not successful, require that he proceed with due regard to his own
interests, as well as those of the lessor. No obligation rests on him to
16. Martin, supra note 7, at 194.
17. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905); 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 802.
18. 140 F. 801.
19. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905). This case has been cited
by the Texas Supreme Court in a significant number of landmark decisions in the field of oil and
gas jurisprudence, including Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 92, 325 S.W.2d 684, 695 (1959).
20. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).
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carry the operations beyond the point where they will be profitable to
him, even if some benefit to the lessor will result from them. It is only
to the end that the oil and gas shall be extracted with benefit or profit
to both that reasonable diligence is required.2"
The inclusion of this profit element in the test enunciated in Brewster raised a variety of questions. For example, would the courts require a finding of profitability in all implied covenant cases? 2 2 Also, if
profit is an essential element of the reasonable prudent operator standard in certain circumstances, "[t]he question remains how much profit
must be in prospect ere the law will compel the operator to act under
the implied covenants?" 2
The courts have answered these queries in a variety of ways. The
Texas courts include the element of profitability in the reasonable prudent operator standard in most cases involving implied covenants. For
example, in a recent case involving the implied covenant to protect the
leasehold, 2 ' the Texas Supreme Court held as follows: "There is no
duty [to protect the leasehold] unless such an amount 'of oil can be
recovered to equal the cost of administrative expenses, drilling or reworking and equipping a protection well, prodficing and marketing the
oil, and yield to the lessee a reasonable expectation of profit." 25
As will be discussed below, different jurisdictions reach different
conclusions in resolving the question of whether or not this element of
profitability is included in the reasonable prudent operator standard in
cases involving the implied covenant of exploration.26 Frequently, this
issue of profitability becomes the determinative issue in cases involving
the implied covenant of exploration.
C.

Implied in Law or Implied in Fact

The courts and commentators have also debated whether implied
covenants are implied in law or implied in fact.27 A covenant that is
implied in fact gives effect to the presumed intent of the parties as
evidenced by the entirety of their contract and the purposes of the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 290 (1940).
Id.
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
Id. at 568.
See infra text accompanying notes 54-149.
See generally, 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 803; 1 E.

27.
SMITH & J.
WEAVER, supra note 6, at 245; R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.1 (1983).
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transaction."8 A covenant that is implied in law is not predicated upon
the intent of the parties; rather, it is implied in order to assure fair
dealing and to prevent unfairness.2
This distinction is relevant to the topic of this article because the
determination of whether an implied covenant is implied in law or implied in fact may affect, at least in part, whether an express provision
of an oil and gas lease will supersede an implied covenant on the same
subject. Under the theory that implied covenants are implied in law,
express lease language, while relevant, will not necessarily be determinative in a disagreement over a lessee's implied obligations.3 0 Under
the theory that implied covenants are implied in fact, express lease provisions are presumed to set forth the intent of the parties and, absent
gross overreaching or unconscionability, the express lease provisions
generally supersede implied covenants on the same subject.3 "
The Texas courts have generally treated implied covenants as implied in fact,32 although certain statements' to the contrary can be
found in the case law.3 3 Although the Arkansas courts do not appear to
have directly discussed this issue, one commentator has stated that the
Arkansas courts generally treat implied covenants as implied in fact. "

III.

THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF EXPLORATION IN GENERAL

Not all jurisdictions and commentators recognize an implied covenant of exploration distinct from the implied covenant of development.
A.

Classifications of Implied Covenants

Various states and commentators have developed different classifications and listings of implied covenants. For example, Professor Merrill has classified the implied covenants as follows:
28. 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 245; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 4, § 803; R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 27, § 8.1.
29. 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 244; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 4, § 803; Martin, supra note 7, at 193.
30. 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 245.
31. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 179-226.
32. See, e.g., Gulf Prod. Co. v. Kishi, 129 Tex. 487, 103 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1937); 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 247.
33. See, e.g., W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929);
1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 247.
34. Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas, 10 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 699, 705
(1987).
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I. The implied covenant to drill an exploratory well.
II. The implied covenant to drill additional wells.
III. The implied covenant for diligent and proper operation of the
wells and for marketing the product, if oil or gas is discovered in paying quantities.
IV. The implied covenant to protect the leased premises against drainage by wells on adjoining land. 5
Williams and Meyers offer a more expansive listing of the implied
covenants, expressly including an implied covenant of exploration:
(1) The covenant to drill an initial exploratory well.
(2)The covenant to protect the leasehold from drainage.
(3)The covenant to reasonably develop the premises.
(4)The covenant to explore further.
(5)The covenant to market the product.
(6)The covenant to conduct with reasonable care and due diligence
all operations on the leasehold that affect the lessor's royalty
36
interest.
The classification of implied covenants set forth by the Texas Supreme Court does not include an implied covenant of exploration:
"There are three generally recognized implied covenants in Texas: (1.)
to develop the premises, (2.) to protect the leased premises, and (3.) to
manage and administer the lease.""7
Despite the fact that Texas does not recognize an implied covenant
of exploration, some other jurisdictions and commentators recognize
the implied covenant of exploration as a separate and distinct covenant
from the implied covenant of development. The following is a brief review of the distinctions between the covenants.
B. The "Traditional"
Development

Definition

of the

Implied

Covenant

of

Under the traditional definition of the implied covenant of development, the covenant is the duty implied in an oil and gas lease that
obligates the lessee, after obtaining production in paying quantities
from a leasehold, to drill additional wells to further develop the prem35. M. MERRILL, supra note 22, at 23; see also 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4,
§ 804; R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 7, § 8.1; Martin, supra note 7, at 179.
36. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 804.
37. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1989); see also
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981); 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra
note 6, at 243.
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ises.3 8 The lessor has the burden, under the traditional formulation of
the covenant, to prove that an additional well "would result in a benefit
or profit for both the lessor and the lessee." 39 As a practical matter,
this burden of proof requires the lessor to establish that the producing
geologic stratum requires additional wells, or that there is a reasonable
probability that a different productive stratum exists."' This traditional
definition of the implied covenant of development is not followed in all
states."'
C. The "Traditional"
Exploration

Definition

of the

Implied

Covenant

of

The statement of a uniform definition of the implied covenant of
exploration is not possible due to the differing treatment afforded the
covenant by the various jurisdictions and commentators. Under the
traditional definition,' 2 however, the implied covenant of exploration
would impose upon a lessee, after obtaining production in paying quantities from the leasehold, the obligation to explore undeveloped portions
of the leasehold, both vertically and laterally, for new, potentially productive formations. 4 3 In order to prove breach of the covenant, a lessor
would establish such facts as the length of time that has expired without drilling, minimal drilling activity in relation to the size of the tract,
and lack of seismic or other exploratory activity. 4 The lessor would not
be required to prove that any further drilling would be profitable "because the requirement [of profitability] 5is not material to ordinary prudent operation in unproven territory."'
D. The Theoretical Difference Between the Implied Covenant of Development and the Implied Covenant of Exploration
The leading proponents of the implied covenant of exploration,
38.

Pickerill, Is There A New Implied Covenant of Explorvelopment, 31

INST. ON OIL AND

GAS L. AND TAX'N 245, 247 (1980); Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 90 325 S.W.2d 684, 693

(1959).
39. Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 90, 325 S.W.2d 684, 693 (1959); see also Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1989).
40. Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 92, 325 S.W.2d 684, 695 (1959).
41. See, e.g., Byrd v. Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
42. Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1955).
43. 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 259; Martin, supra note 7, at 188; 8 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 385 (1987).
44. Meyers, supra note 42, at 563.
45. Id.; Martin, supra note 7, at 188; 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 259.
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Williams and Meyers, have argued that the implied covenant of exploration should be recognized as a separate and distinct covenant from
the implied covenant of development because the two covenants attempt to redress distinct forms of injury to the lessor. 6 In a development case, the lessor seeks more wells in a known producing formation
because he suffers from the harm of delayed recovery of, or permanent
loss of, recoverable reserves. In an exploration case, the lessor seeks the
drilling of exploratory wells in new formations; since the lessor granted
the exclusive right of exploration to the lessee, if the lessee will not drill
exploratory wells, they will not be drilled. 7
Williams and Meyers argue that the distinct harms suffered by the
lessor in development and exploration cases must be redressed by the
adoption of different standards of what a reasonable prudent operator
would do in each situation. In a development case, a reasonable prudent operator would not drill into a known producing horizon unless he
could be reasonably assured that the development well would be profitable. In an exploration case, however, Williams and Meyers argue that
a reasonable prudent operator would not need to be assured that the
exploratory well would be profitable.4 As a result, the burden of proof
on a lessor in an exploration case would not be to demonstrate that an
exploratory well promises a reasonable expectation of profit to both lessor and lessee, but rather to show that under the circumstances the
failure to drill the exploratory well has been unreasonable.49 Among
the circumstances that Williams and Meyers consider relevant to this
inquiry are the length of time since the last well was drilled, the number and location of the wells on the leasehold premises in comparison to
the size of the tract, and the existence of untested geologic formations
that appear favorable to the accumulation of hydrocarbons.5 0
Some states, including Arkansas, appear to have adopted an implied covenant very similar to that proposed by Williams and Meyers,
although the covenant is often included within the covenant of development rather than adopted as a separate covenant.51 In contrast, the
Texas Supreme Court has rejected the implied covenant of exploration
46. Meyers, supra note 42, at 555; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 841;
Meyers & Williams, The Implied Duty to Explore Further: Recent Texas Developments, 41
TEx. L. REV. 789 (1962).
47. Meyers, supra note 42, at 555.
48. Id. at 557; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, at § 841.
49. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, at § 841.
50. Id.
51. R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 27, § 8.3; Wright, supra note 34, at 716.
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as formulated by Williams and Meyers. 2 Under Texas law, there is no
implied requirement to drill a well where profitability cannot be
demonstrated. This requirement of profitability effectively defeats the
implied covenant of exploration, whether the covenant is identified by
name or included within the rubric of the implied covenant to
develop.5"
IV.

THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF EXPLORATION IN TEXAS

The implied covenant of exploration has been discussed in relatively few cases in Texas. In 1956, a Texas appellate court adopted the
implied covenant of exploration in Willingham v. Bryson. 4 Three years
later, the Texas Supreme Court overruled Willingham v. Bryson and
established the modern Texas rule in Clifton v. Koontz.6 5 This decision
was followed by a succession of cases 56 that did not add much to Texas
law, but which provided opportunities for commentators to raise questions about the rule set forth in Clifton. During the latter part of 1989,
the Texas Supreme Court issued its decision on rehearing in Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Jackson,5 7 clarifying Texas law and
strongly affirming the rule of Clifton v. Koontz.
A.

Clifton v. Koontz

The Texas Supreme Court set forth the basis for the current Texas
law regarding the implied covenant of exploration in Clifton v.
Koontz." In 1940, the lessor executed an oil and gas lease covering 350
acres of land for a ten year primary term. A marginally profitable oil
well was drilled in 1949. No other operations were conducted on the
leased premises until 1956 when the well was reworked by "sandfracting." Prior to the reworking of the well, the lessor filed suit seeking
52. See Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959) (overruling Willingham v.
Bryson, 294 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1956, no writ)); Sun Exploration & Prod.
Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1989).
53. Meyers, supra note 42, at 557.
54. 294 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort Worth 1956, no writ).
55. 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
56. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 952 (1960); Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 334 S.W.2d 449
(Tex. Civ. App--El Paso 1960, writ refd n.r.e.); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Gruy, 720 S.W.2d 121
(Tex. Civ. App--San Antonio 1986, writ refd n.r.e.).
57. 783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1989).
58. 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959); see also MEYERS & WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at
791 (discussing decisions prior to Clifton v. Koontz).
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cancellation of the lease on the theory that the lessee "breached an
implied covenant to reasonably develop the property and to 'reasonably
explore the same for the production of minerals therefrom.' ",q
The trial court ordered cancellation of the lease, except as to productive horizons, unless the lessee commenced a test well within sixty
days of the judgment. The action of the trial court was consistent with
the rule previously set forth in Willingham v. Bryson.60 In Willingham
the appellate court stated:
[A] lessee impliedly covenants reasonably to explore a lease after
production has been obtained, under penalty of cancellation if he fails
so to do; .. the lessor is not required to prove that the drilling of an
additional well would probably result in a profit; and . . . the prudent
operator rule was satisfied upon a showing that no well had been
drilled . . . since the discovery of gas on . . .[the leasehold], coupled
with the testimony of one witness that he would be willing to drill
another well.61
The court of appeals in Clifton reversed the trial court's requirement that the lessee drill another well and rendered judgment for the
lessee. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, overruling Willingham v.
Bryson.
The Texas Supreme Court stated that the lessor had the burden of
proving that the lessee had violated the implied covenant of development. In order to meet this burden, the lessor would have to prove that
a reasonable probability exists that a development well drilled to the
producing stratum, or to a strata different from the producing stratum,
would result in profit to both the lessor and lessee. The court held that
the lessor in Clifton had failed to meet this burden of proof:
The petitioners did not discharge the burden which rested upon them
to prove, as required, that the lessees failed to measure up to the standard of the prudent operator. While it is true that each separate stratum or horizon would be entitled to separate development, yet it is
equally true that the burden rests upon the lessor to prove that the
producing stratum required additional wells, or that strata different
from that from which production is being obtained, in reasonable
probability exist, and that by the drilling of additional wells there
would be a reasonable expectation of profit to the lessee. Under such
circumstances, the lessee's obligation as to development is measured
59.
60.
61.

Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 86, 325 S.W.2d 684, 687 (1959).
294 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App--Forth Worth 1956, no writ).
Id. at 425.
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by the rule of reasonable diligence or what an ordinarily prudent and
diligent operator would do, and he is not required to continue in the
performance of these duties or to engage in the performance of such
implied duties unless there is a reasonable expectation of profit, not
only to the lessor, but also to the lessee."
The court then specifically rejected the theory that there was an
implied covenant of exploration distinct from the implied covenant of
development: "We hold that there is no implied covenant to explore as
distinguished from the implied covenant to conduct additional development after production in paying quantities has been obtained." 63 The
principal basis for rejecting the implied covenant of exploration was
that "[tihis theory is untenable and is diametrically opposed to our established 'prudent64 operator' rule where expectation of profit is an essential element."
Despite the holding of the court, the opinion in Clifton seemingly
left open an exception to the general rule:
However, it should be noted that we do not have a factual situation
where the lease covers several thousand acres and an effort is being
made to hold such vast acreage by showing production from a comparatively small area. Neither are we confronted with a situation
where an unreasonably long length of time has elapsed since the last
development of the leased premises. Therefore, we do not pass upon
these questions.65
The opinion of the Texas Supreme Court has provided arguments
to both opponents and proponents of the implied covenant of exploration. Opponents of the covenant argued that the court had effectively
eradicated the implied covenant of exploration in two ways. First, the
court had expressly denounced the covenant of exploration as a distinct
covenant from the implied covenant of development. Second, by means
of the requirement that a lessor show a reasonable expectation of profit
to both lessor and lessee from any additional well, the court had prevented the covenant of exploration from expanding the implied covenant of development.
Proponents of the implied covenant of exploration cited the "exception" set forth by the court for large tracts of land as support for
62.
63.
64.
65.

Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 695 (Tex. 1959).
Id. at 696; see I E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 260.
Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 697 (Tex. 1959).
Id. at 696.
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their argument that the implied covenant of exploration remained viable in Texas under certain factual circumstances. Also, the proponents
stated that the burden of proof regarding the profitability of an exploratory well was not necessarily an impossible burden to meet if courts
interpreted the phrase "reasonable expectation of profit" in light of the
realities of an exploratory operation.6 6
B.

Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson

The Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit rendered its opinion in
Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson6 7 soon after the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Clifton v. Koontz. The lessors in Masterson, between 1916 and 1938, had executed thirty-one separate oil and gas
leases covering their 90,000 acre ranch. By mesne conveyances, the gas
rights were owned by Colorado Interstate Gas Company and the oil
rights were owned by Sinclair. Colorado and its predecessors in title
had fully explored and developed the leased premises for gas by 1955,
but Sinclair had not drilled any oil wells.
The lessors filed suit against Sinclair "to enforce the implied covenant or covenants, alleged to exist in and as a part of each of such
leases, for adequate exploration and development of the lands covered
by such leases insofar as oil is concerned." 6 The trial court granted a
form of conditional cancellation of the leases, and Sinclair appealed.
The Fifth Circuit distinguished the facts of Clifton v. Koontz from
the facts in Masterson. Based upon the "exception" for large tracts of
land set forth in the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Clifton,6 9 the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the trial court without requiring
proof that any drilling by the lessee would result in a profit to both
lessor and lessee.7 °
A subsequent Texas Court of Appeals decision refused to follow
Masterson, stating: "We do not think this case has distinguished the
facts of the [Clifton] case, nor do we believe it follows it."' In a subsequent decision, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that its decision in
66. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 845.6.
67. 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 952 (1960).
68. Id. at 313.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
70. 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 264.
71. Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 334 S.W.2d 449, 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Gruy, 720 S.W.2d 121, 124
(Tex. Civ. App--San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Masterson had been repudiated by the Texas courts. 72 Thus, the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Masterson should not be considered as an
authoritative statement of Texas law.
C. Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.
In Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp." the lessors sued for partial cancellation of two leases covering an aggregate of
31,260 acres of land "based on the alleged ground that the defendantlessees and their predecessors in title had breached the implied covenant in the leases to explore . . . ."I After a trial to a jury, a takenothing judgment was rendered on the verdict in favor of the lessees.
The court of civil appeals affirmed, stating, "We hold here, as was held
by the Supreme Court in the [Clifton] case, that there is no implied
covenant to explore, as distinguished from the implied covenant to conduct additional development after production in paying quantities has
75'
been obtained.
The court of civil appeals recognized that it was faced with a situation similar to that suggested by the Texas Supreme Court in the
Clifton "exception, ' 7 but held that the "exception" was inapplicable.
In reaching this conclusion, the court reaffirmed the principle that the
implied covenant of development applies to the lease in its entirety and
not to any particular portion of the lease. Felmont was cited and followed by the Texas Supreme Court in both of its decisions in Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Jackson.7 7
D.

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Gruy

In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Gruy 78 the lessors executed two leases
in 1944. Through mesne conveyances and releases, the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) had become the lessee of 1,888 acres as to all
depths below 3,750 feet. The leases were held by production in paying
quantities from shallow zones above 3,750 feet, but no wells had been
drilled to the deeper zones prior to the date of the lawsuit. The lessors
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966).
334 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App.--El Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 451.
Id. at 457 (citations omitted).
Id. at 456; see supra text accompanying note 65.
31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 604 (July 13, 1988); 783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1989).
720 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App--San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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sued to cancel the leases as to depths below 3,750 feet.79
The trial to a jury found that ARCO had failed to develop the
leased premises as a reasonable prudent operator would have under
similar circumstances. The lessors, however, had failed to introduce any
evidence that development below 3,750 feet would lead to any discovery of hydrocarbons. The only evidence introduced to indicate a lack of
due diligence by ARCO was that no wells had been drilled in over
twenty-six years. 80
The court of civil appeals reversed on the basis that there was no
evidence to support the findings of the jury. According to the court,
"the unrefutable fact remains that a 'prudent operator' would not drill
absent some evidence the drilling would be profitable."8 1
E. Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Jackson
Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Jackson8 2 is the most recent
statement by the Texas Supreme Court regarding the implied covenant
of exploration.
1. Facts
In March of 1938, Ocie R. Jackson and other interested members
of the Jackson family executed an oil, gas, and mineral lease to Sun
covering 10,000 acres of the Jackson Brothers Ranch. A portion of the
working interest was subsequently conveyed to Amoco Production
Company. In 1941, Sun discovered on the leased premises a reservoir
commonly known as the Oyster Bayou Field. Subsequently, Sun drilled
sixty-four additional wells on the leased premises.8" At the time of trial,
thirty-seven wells were producing hydrocarbons, all from the Seabreeze
Sands in the Oyster Bayou Field.84 The Oyster Bayou Field comprised
about 1,800 acres of the 10,000-acre leased premises.8 5
Sun had conducted thirteen seismic surveys on the leased premises
prior to 1979. In 1979, Sun attempted to conduct another seismic survey of the premises, but the Jacksons refused to negotiate a seismic
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
ton [Ist
84.
85.

Id. at 122.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124.
783 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. 1989).
Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 715 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Civ. App.--HousDist.] 1986).
Id.
Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 604, 605 (July 13, 1988).
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agreement and denied Sun access to the leased premises." Sun and
Amoco sued the Jacksons to establish the validity of the lease and to
enjoin the Jacksons from interfering with their right to enter the leased
premises. The Jacksons counterclaimed, alleging breach of implied covenants to reasonably develop and explore the entire lease, and seeking
cancellation of the lease.87
2.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The suit was tried on its merits in 1984. The two issues submitted
to the jury, and the jury's responses thereto, were as follows:
Special Issue No. 1: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Sun has failed to reasonably develop the Jackson Lease?
Answer: 'Sun has failed' or 'Sun has not failed' in the space provided.
Answer: Sun has not failed.
In answering Special Issue No. 1, you are instructed that the term 'to
reasonably develop' means the development which a prudent operator
would do with respect to any known producing formation of the lease.
In this context, reasonable development may include the drilling of
additional wells into any such producing formation. A prudent operator will undertake to drill additional wells into such producing formation only if there is a reasonable expectation that the proceeds, if any,
from the production obtained, if any, as a result of such drilling will
exceed the cost of drilling and operating the well and still produce a
reasonable profit for the operators, bearing in mind the interests of
both the Lessors and Lessee.
Special Issue No. 2: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Sun has failed to reasonably explore the portions of the
Jackson Lease which lie outside the Oyster Bayou Field:
Answer: 'Sun has failed' or 'Sun has not failed.'
Answer: Sun has failed.
In answering Special Issue No. 2, you are instructed that Sun must
conduct itself as a reasonable and prudent operator would while exercising due diligence under the same or similar circumstances, with a
reasonable expectation of profit, considering the interests of both the
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
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Lessors and the Lessee."
Based upon the responses of the jury to the Special Issues, the trial
court rendered judgment for the Jacksons. The trial court unconditionally cancelled portions of the lease on which Sun had not drilled extensively. The court also conditionally cancelled other portions of the lease
below the depth to which Sun had drilled in the Oyster Bayou Field,
subject to the right of Sun and Amoco "to earn back such portions by
drilling additional wells." 89
3.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's unconditional cancellation and reversed and remanded as to the conditional cancellation. 90 In reaching this decision, the court of appeals classified oil and
gas wells in three categories: wildcat wells, exploratory development
wells, and additional development wells. 9 1
"Wildcat wells" were defined by the court as being wells drilled
into unproven sand in a new field. 92 "Exploratory development wells"
were defined as wells drilled into an unproven but potentially productive formation.9" "Additional development wells" were defined as wells
that tap into an already producing formation. 4 The court of appeals
stated that the decision to drill wildcat wells was not necessarily based
on a "prudent operator's reasonable expectation of profit."' 5 Conversely, exploratory development wells and additional development
wells would necessarily be drilled based upon a reasonable expectation
of profit to the lessor and the lessee.' 6
The court of appeals reviewed the findings of the jury in light of
these three categories of wells. The court interpreted the word "develop" in Special Issue No. 1 as referring to the drilling of additional
wells to the one "known producing" formation in the Oyster Bayou
Field. The word "explore" in Special Issue No. 2 was interpreted as
88.
89.
ton [1st
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 608.
Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 715 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. Civ. App--HousDist.] 1986).
Id.
Id. at 202.
id.
Id.
Id.
id.
Id, at 202.
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referring to the drilling of additional wells to test potentially producing
formations outside of the Oyster Bayou Field. Based on this distinction,
the court reasoned that a jury finding that Sun had failed to "explore"
by drilling wildcat wells would have violated the rule of Clifton v.
Koontz, because such a finding could not have been based upon a reasonable expectation of profit to the lessor and lessee. A jury finding
that Sun had failed to "explore" by drilling exploratory development
wells, however, could be supported under the rule of Clifton v.
Koontz."'
The court of appeals concluded that the jury's finding, that Sun
had failed to reasonably explore the portions of the Jackson lease which
lie outside the Oyster Bayou Field, was a finding that Sun had failed to
drill exploratory development wells rather than wildcat wells.98 As a
result, the court affirmed the unconditional cancellation of undeveloped
portions of the lease. The court reversed and remanded, however, the
conditional cancellation of depths below the Oyster Bayou Field on the
grounds that the conditions imposed on Sun and Amoco by the trial
court were unreasonable.
4.

The Original Opinion of the Texas Supreme Court

The Texas Supreme Court has rendered two opinions in this case;
the first opinion was withdrawn and the opinion on the motion for rehearing was substituted in its place. The content of the court's first
opinion, which was joined by only three justices, and the concurring
opinions, are worthy of note.9 9
The Texas Supreme Court dismissed the court of appeals' categorization of types of wells as being "unimportant. 10 0 The court in Clifton had intended the implied covenant of development to apply to "the
drilling of all additional wells after production on the lease is obtained." 10 1 Thus, categorization of wells was unnecessary; the critical
inquiry as to all additional wells was "whether the lessor could prove a
97. Id.
98. Id. at 203.
99. The authors of two of the concurring opinions expressed the view ultimately adopted
by the court on rehearing that Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959), controlled
and that the jury finding in Special Issue No. I was dispositive of the case. Sun Exploration &
Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 604 (July 13, 1988) (Wallace, J., concurring, and
Kilgarlin, J., concurring).
100. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 604, 609 (July 13, 1988).
101. Id.
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reasonable expectation of profit to lessor and lessee." 1 2
The court then departed from the holding of Clifton and divided
exploration and development activities into two separate covenants. The
court, however, stated that this distinction was for definitional purposes
only:
In the case at hand, we have confusion of labels rather than confusion
of substance. We could retain the single label of "the covenant of reasonable development," however, it is a more descriptive and technically differentiating view to distinguish between development and exploration activities. By recognizing the difference in the activities, the
allegations in the pleadings, the proof presented, and the issues to be
tried will be clearer to all parties, and the trial will be conducted more
efficiently. All the activities taking place within a known or producing
formation come under the implied covenant of reasonable development. All those activities outside a known producing formation come
under the implied covenant of further exploration.1' 3
Although the exploration and development activities that were previously included under the implied covenant of development were now
"technically redefined" as the bases for separate covenants, the court
stated that the substance of Clifton remained the same. 0 4 Under both
the implied covenant of exploration and the implied covenant of development, "[i]n order for the court to impose an obligation on the lessee,
the activity must hold a reasonable expectation of profit to the lessor
and lessee." 10 5
The court then turned to the question: "What do we mean by reasonable expectation of profitability in the exploratory context?" 10 The
Jacksons had presented evidence at trial based upon the "expected
value" test of profitability. According to the court, this test would
"compare the estimated costs of drilling a given well against the possible income from the well and the probability that the income will actually be realized. 1 0° Under this test, a low probability of success for a
given well could be outweighed by the possibility of large profits. 0 8
102. Id.
103. Id. at 610.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 611.
108. Id.; see Williams, supra note 11; Allison, Explorvelopment: A Theoretical Hybrid
Searching for Fertile Legal Soil In An Unfertile Economy, 39 INST. ON OIL AND GAs L. AND
TAX'N. 9-1, 9-11 (1988); 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 261.
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The court rejected the "expected value" test in favor of a more
traditional test that focuses upon the probability of discovering hydrocarbons from any given well. The court recognized that this test imposed a difficult burden on a lessor in an exploration case, but indicated
that the future development of oil and gas technology would perhaps
lessen the burden. 109 Based upon the foregoing standard of profitability,
the court concluded that the Jacksons had not proven a reasonable expectation of profit.
The Jacksons argued that it would not be necessary to show a reasonable expectation of profit under the exception for large tracts of
land set forth in Clifton v. Koontz; that is, no reasonable expectation of
profit is necessary "where the lease covers several thousand acres and
an effort is being made to hold such vast acreage by showing production from a comparatively small area."' 110 The Texas Supreme Court
stated, "while this exception language may hold true under the appropriate circumstances, the circumstances at hand do not warrant an exception to the rule.""' In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court
cited evidence presented at trial that more than $24,800,000 had been
spent on the Jackson lease, that approximately sixty-six wells had been
drilled on the lease, including at least sixteen wells outside of the Oyster Bayou Field, and that royalties on production at times exceeded
$10,000 per day. These facts, according to the court, "are not the facts
that would support an exception to the rule that the lessor prove a reasonable expectation of profit to both the lessor and lessee.""' 2
Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the court
of appeals and declared the lease to be valid.
5.

The Opinion of the Texas Supreme Court on Motion for
Rehearing

On motion for rehearing, the court rendered a terse opinion that it
substituted for the previous opinion. The court's opinion on the motion
for rehearing affirmed the rule of Clifton v. Koontz."'
The court reaffirmed the holding of Clifton that no implied covenant of exploration exists independent of the implied covenant of development. The single covenant applies to the drilling of all additional
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 31 Tex. Sup, Ct. J. 604, 611 (July 13, 1988).
Id. at 612 (citing Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (1959)).
Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 604, 612 (July 13, 1988).
Id.
160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
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wells after production on the lease is obtained. The court restated the
Clifton definition of "additional wells" as "both additional wells in an
already producing formation or stratum, or additional wells in 'strata
different from that from which production is being obtained.' "14 The
critical question, according to the court, continues to be "whether the
lessor could prove a reasonable expectation of profit to lessor and
lessee." 15'
The court then analyzed the jury's findings in light of the foregoing statement of Texas law. In answer to Special Issue No. 1, the jury
found that Sun had not failed to "reasonably develop the Jackson
Lease."1 6' The supreme court held that this finding was dispositive of
the case:
The law of Texas does not impose a separate implied duty upon a
lessee to further explore the leasehold premises; the law recognizes
only an implied obligation to reasonably develop the leasehold. Because the jury determined that Sun has not failed to reasonably develop the Jackson lease, the court of appeals should have rendered
judgment for Sun. In failing to do this, the court erred.'
The court stated that the court of appeals misinterpreted Special
Issue No. 1. The court of appeals had interpreted the issue and the
instructions that accompanied it as limiting the jury's review of the
issue of reasonable development to the drilling of additional development wells within the Oyster Bayou Field. That is, the court of appeals
had interpreted the phrase "known producing formation of the lease"
as limiting the issue of reasonable development to "formations which
are currently producing hydrocarbons on the Jackson lease."' 1 8
The correct view, according to the Texas Supreme Court, was that
the reference in Special Issue No. 1 to a "known producing formation
of the lease" referred to "any formation on the lease that is currently
producing or that has been determined to be productive of hydrocarbons but is not producing now."' 1 9 In addition, the court stated that the
instruction accompanying Special Issue No. 1 allowed the jury to consider reservoirs other than the Oyster Bayou Field in its analysis of the
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1989).
Id.
Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 604, 608 (July 13, 1988).
Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1989).
Id. at 205 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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development issue.12 As a result, according to the supreme court, the
jury deliberations regarding Special Issue No. 1 encompassed all elements of the Texas implied covenant of reasonable development, and
therefore the jury's finding on the issue was dispositive of the case.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals, and held that the Jackson lease was still valid.
6.

The Current Status of Texas Law

The Texas Supreme Court denied a motion for a rehearing of its
decision in Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Jackson on February
21, 1990.121 As a result, the current status of Texas law remains as it
has been for many years:
(i) No implied covenant of exploration exists independent of the
implied covenant of reasonable development.
(ii) In order to prove that the lessee has violated the implied covenant of reasonable development, the lessor has the burden of proving
that the lessee failed to act as a reasonable prudent operator in the
circumstances. That is, in cases involving the implied covenant of development, the lessor must prove that a reasonable prudent operator
would drill an additional well or wells on the leased premises.
(iii) In order to prove that the lessee failed to act as a reasonable
prudent operator by failing to drill an additional well, the lessor has the
burden of establishing that the well would be profitable to the lessee.
This profitability element in the reasonable prudent operator standard
is applicable to the drilling of all additional wells after production on
the lease is obtained.
V.

THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF EXPLORATION IN ARKANSAS

The Arkansas courts have not recognized an implied covenant of
exploration by name.1 22 The implied covenant of development, however,
is defined and applied so broadly in Arkansas that it has become, in
effect if not in name, very similar to the traditional definition 2 ' of the
implied covenant of exploration.
The principal reason for the broad scope and application of Arkan120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 202.
Wright, supra note 34, at 716.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
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sas' implied covenant of development is the particular reasonable prudent operator standard utilized by Arkansas courts in development
cases. Under the Arkansas standard, a lessee is not permitted to hold
undeveloped portions of a lease indefinitely, even in the absence of
proof that additional wells are likely to be profitable.""' Failure to continue the search for oil and gas with reasonable diligence throughout
the entirety of a lease will constitute a breach of the implied covenant
of development. 2 5 As a result, the Arkansas law is much harsher on
the lessee than the law of Texas.
The Arkansas Supreme Court cases Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins'2 6
and Byrd v. Bradham 27 demonstrate the scope of Arkansas' implied
covenant of development.
A.

Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins

In Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 2 an oil and gas lease was executed
in 1943 covering 360 acres of land. Skelly, as successor to the original
lessee, drilled five wells between 1945 and 1953. One well was a dry
hole, and Skelly subsequently released the forty acre tract where the
dry hole had been drilled. The other four wells were producing from a
single forty acre tract. Skelly refused to drill a well on the remaining
280 acres, and the lessors sued to cancel the lease as to said 280 acres.
In holding that the lessors were entitled to cancellation as to the
280 acres, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated the Arkansas rule as
follows:
So it may be taken, as the well-settled rule in this State, that there is
an implied covenant on the part of the lessee in oil and gas leases to
proceed with a reasonable diligence in the search for oil and gas, and
also to continue the search with reasonable diligence, to the end that
oil and gas may be produced in paying quantities throughout the
whole of the leased premises.' 29
Skelly contended that additional wells could not be drilled and operated except at a great loss. The court replied: "This contention may
be disposed of by saying that, if true, the lessees have not been damWright, supra note 34, at 716.
See, e.g., Ezzell v. Oil Assocs., Inc., 180 Ark. 802, 810, 22 S.W.2d 1015, 1018 (1930).
231 Ark. 357, 329 S.W.2d 424 (1959).
280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
231 Ark. 357, 329 S.W.2d 424 (1959).
Id. at 358, 329 S.W.2d at 425 (quoting Ezzell v. Oil Assocs., Inc., 180 Ark. 802, 22
S.W.2d 1015 (1930)).
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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aged by the cancellation of so much of the contract of lease as cannot
be profitably performed." 13 Based on this much-quoted statement, the
reasonable prudent operator standard in Arkansas development cases
does not include an element of profitability.
The holding in Skelly appears to be based on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum
Corp.' and the public policy disfavoring lessees holding undeveloped
acreage out of commerce:
The production of oil on a small portion of the leased tract cannot
justify the lessee's holding the balance indefinitely and depriving the
lessor not only of the expected royalty from production pursuant to
the lease, but of the privilege of making some other arrangements for
availing himself of the mineral contents of the land. 3 '
B.

Byrd v. Bradham

In Byrd v. Bradham,"33 an oil and gas lease covering eighty acres
of land was executed in 1952, for a primary term of ten years. In 1958,
the lessee pooled five acres of the lease with other lands and drilled a
producing well on the pooled unit. The lessor sued to cancel the lease as
to acreage outside of the pooled unit.
In holding that the lessor was entitled to a cancellation as to the
unproductive seventy-five acres, the Arkansas Supreme Court provided
the following summary of the Arkansas law regarding the implied covenant of development:
In oil and gas leases where royalties constitute the chief consideration, an implied covenant exists that the lessee will explore and develop the property with reasonable diligence. The duty to explore extends to the entire tract, and this is especially true where paying
quantities of oil have been found on a part of the tract.
Of course, due deference must be given to the judgment of the
lessee in determining whether to drill, but the lessee must not act arbitrarily. Furthermore, the lessee must act not only for his own benefit
but also for the benefit of the lessor. The lessee's obligation to explore
is a continuing one, even after paying quantities of oil are discovered,
130. Id. at 359, 329 S.W.2d at 426 (quoting Smith v. Moody, 192 Ark. 704, 707, 94
S.W.2d 357, 354 (1936)).
131. 292 U.S. 272 (1934).
132. Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 231 Ark. 357, 359, 329 S.W.2d 424, 426 (1959) (quoting
Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934)).
133. 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
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in order to effect the purpose of the lease. Production on only a small
portion of the leased land does not justify allowing lessees to hold the
entire leasehold indefinitely, thus depriving the lessor of receiving royalties from another arrangement.""4
The lessee argued that she was under no obligation to develop the
leasehold because any additional well would be a "wildcat" well. The
court dismissed this argument, stating that if there was nothing for the
lessee to gain by drilling the wildcat well, then the lessee has lost nothing as a result of the cancellation of the lease.13 5
C.

The Current Status of Arkansas Law

The current status of Arkansas law regarding the lessee's obligation to explore the leased premises can be summarized as follows:
(a) No implied covenant of exploration exists independent of the
implied covenant of development. The implied covenant of development, however, is defined broadly enough to encompass the traditional
definition of the implied covenant of exploration.
(b) A lessee has an implied duty to explore and develop the entire
leased premises with reasonable diligence. Production from only a
small portion of the leased premises does not justify allowing a lessee to
hold the entire leasehold indefinitely.
(c) In order to prove that the lessee has violated the implied covenant of development, the lessor has the burden of proving that the
lessee failed to act as a reasonable prudent operator in the circumstances. In order to meet this burden of proof, the lessor need not prove
that there is a reasonable expectation of profit from the drilling of any
additional well. Instead, the lessor must demonstrate that, given the
circumstances, the lessee has acted in an unreasonable manner in failing to drill additional wells. Circumstances that the courts have considered in making this determination include the following:
136
(i) Inactivity by the lessee for an unreasonable length of time;
or development of
(ii) Requests by lessors for further exploration
137
the leased premises, and refusal by the lessee;
134. Id. at 13-14, 655 S.W.2d at 367 (citations omitted).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Byrd v. Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983) (inactivity by lessee
as to 75 acres for 28 years); Enstar Corp. v. Crystal Oil Co., 294 Ark. 77, 740 S.W.2d 630 (1987)
(inactivity for 24 years).
137. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 231 Ark. 357, 360, 329 S.W.2d 424, 426 (1959)
(The evidence showed "that over a long period of time the lessors attempted to get Skelly to drill
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(iii) Evidence of lack of intent by the lessee to further explore or
develop the leased premises;1 88
(iv) An unreasonably large amount of acreage held by production
by too few wells or by wells located on only a small portion of the
leased premises; 1 9 and
(v) Interest of other operators in exploring the leased premises.'"
VI.

COMPARISON OF TEXAS AND ARKANSAS LAW

Neither Texas nor Arkansas recognizes an implied covenant of exploration independent from the implied covenant of development. In
Texas, the scope of the implied covenant of development is relatively
narrow. Conversely, in Arkansas, the implied covenant of development
is relatively broad. As a result, Arkansas lessors can pursue exploration
cases under the guise of the implied covenant of development.
The distinction between the implied covenants of development as
implemented in Texas and Arkansas lies in the difference between the
reasonable prudent operator standards utilized by the courts. In Texas,
a reasonable prudent operator would not drill an additional well unless
there was a reasonable probability that the drilling of the additional
well would result in a profit to both lessor and lessee. This is consistent
with the seminal case, Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co. 4" Arkansas has
drifted away from this concept. In Arkansas, a reasonable prudent operator would presumably continue to explore and develop the leased
premises without regard to whether any additional well would result in
a reasonable expectation of profit.
The Texas rule has been criticized as imposing a standard of conduct for a reasonable prudent operator that is inappropriate in the exploration context.142 Since exploratory operations by their nature conon the property in question and the lessors did nothing to waive their rights in that respect.").
138. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 231 Ark. 357, 360, 329 S.W.2d 424, 426 (1959)
("Up to the time of the filing of this suit in January, 1956, 13 years after obtaining the lease,
Skelly had evinced no intention of drilling on the 280 acres.").
139. See, e.g., Byrd v. Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983) (one well on 80
acres); Ezzell v. Oil Assocs., Inc., 180 Ark. 802, 22 S.W.2d 1015 (1930) (one well on 1,170
acres).
140. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 231 Ark. 357, 329 S.W.2d 424 (1959); Byrd v.
Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
141. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
142. Note, The Implied Covenant for Further Exploration - Does It Exist in Oklahoma?,
36 OKLA. L. REV. 164, 167 (1983); The policy considerations cited by the proponents of the implied covenant of exploration, such as Williams and Meyers, also argue against the Texas rule.
See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 42; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 841.

54
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template drilling into unproven formations, a requirement that a lessor
must establish the potential profitability of the additional well may in
effect impose an impossible burden of proof.14 3 Thus, it has been asserted that the Texas rule allows mineral interests to remain burdened
'
by "leases that have lost their vitality."""
These criticisms lose sight of
two facts. First, in Texas an oil and gas lease is not a lease, it is the
conveyance of a fee simple determinable estate." 5 The lessee owns the
minerals in place. Second, the Texas law in this area has been well
defined for many years. There is nothing to prevent a lessor from writ-

ing into his contract an obligation to drill additional wells or release
portions of the lease.
The Arkansas rule has been criticized on the basis that the purposes and intent of the contracting parties in an oil and gas lease have
been defeated if the lessor does not have the burden of showing that
additional drilling would be profitable to the lessee."1 6 The Arkansas
courts have rejected this criticism, reasoning that a lessee that has held
a large undeveloped tract of land for a lengthy period of time by virtue
of production from a small portion of the tract is not harmed by cancellation of the undeveloped portions of the lease because the lessee was
apparently not going to drill anyway." 7 This argument seems to assume that the right to delay exploration of the undeveloped portions of
a leasehold is worth nothing to a lessee, a premise that is not compatible with economic reality and ignores the fact that the lessor and lessee
may have included this speculative value in the negotiation of their oil
143. The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of meeting this burden of proof
in its first opinion in Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 604, 610 (July
13, 1988) ("Practically speaking, it will be more difficult to prove a breach of the covenant of
further exploration than breach of the covenant of reasonable development.").
144. Allison, supra note 108, at 9-5.
145. The term 'lease' when used in an oil and gas context, is a misnomer. The estate
created by the oil and gas lease is not the same as those interests created under a 'lease'
governed by the law of landlord and tenant. The common oil and gas lease creates a
determinable fee. It vests the lessee with title to oil and gas in place.
Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982).
146. Allison, supra note 108, at 9-8; Note, supra note 142, at 168, 175; see Mitchell v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 448 (Okla. 1981)
Failure to recognize the profit motive as an instrumental force in oil and gas leases on
behalf of lessee and lessor is to ignore the very essence of the contract. It is unquestionable that both the lessee and lessor intended to benefit monetarily from the produce of
the land through sale of its hydrocarbons.
Id.
147. Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 231 Ark. 357, 329 S.W.2d 424, 426 (1959); Byrd v.
Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 14, 655 S.W.2d 366, 367 (1983).
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and gas lease. 4
The Arkansas rule is further subject to the criticisms that have
been levied against the traditional formulation of the implied covenant
of exploration. Commentators have criticized the covenant as requiring
lessees to become unwilling wildcatters, forced to continually drill in
order to retain leasehold acreage.14 The covenant is also criticized as
sacrificing long term economic interests in national energy development
and environmental protection in favor of the short term interests of individual lessors.' 50 As stated by Professor Martin:
The law of implied covenants, even after the institution of a regime of
conservation, has required operators to maximize short-term profitability rather than seek long-term maximization (which may be regarded as long-term profitability or as institutional survival). If the
operator has the possibility of making a profit now by drilling, he
must, even though it might make more for both the lessor and itself
over the long term by delaying development. The law at present regards a willingness to delay development and further exploration as
speculation. The field of economics might regard it as a means of
optimizing the benefits of energy development over the long run.
Speculation is a highly pejorative term which in economic fact means
simply that the person possessing the commodity or controlling the
activity believes that it may be worth more at a later time than at the
present. This in turn means that the optimum value of the goods or
activity to society, as reflected through the market mechanism, may
be at a later time than at present.'
The Texas courts and the Arkansas courts have reached opposite
results in cases involving the implied covenant of exploration. Both
positions have been criticized. It is the authors' view that neither rule
is subject to valid criticism at this date. The law of both states has
been well defined for many years. Lessors and lessees alike know, or
should know, what the law is, and the courts cannot be faulted for continuing to apply existing law.
148.

Wright, supra note 34, at 712.
149. See, e.g., Brown, The ProposedNew Covenant of Further Exploration: Reply to Comment, 37 TEx. L. REv. 303 (1959).
150. See, e.g., Frois, Suggested Solutions to Lessee's Dilemma Over the Development and
Exploration Covenants in Louisiana, 30 INST. ON MIN. L. 54 (1983); Martin, supra note 7.
151. Martin, supra note 7, at 207.
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REMEDIES

A. General Remedies in Implied Covenant of Exploration and Development Cases
The remedies that are discussed in implied covenant cases generally include damages, cancellation, and conditional cancellation."' 2
Based upon the traditional definitions of the implied covenants of development and exploration,15 3 different remedies would be appropriate for
the breach of each covenant.
In cases involving the traditional implied covenant of development,
damages would be the proper remedy. The damages would be measured by the royalty on the oil or gas that the additional development
well would have produced from the time it ought to have been
drilled.15 '
In cases involving the traditional implied covenant of exploration,
damages would not be a proper remedy because it is not possible to
calculate the amount of royalties on the oil or gas, if any, that would
have been produced from an additional well drilled to an unproven formation. Accordingly, the favored remedy has been cancellation or conditional cancellation." 5
B.

Damages

As a general rule, the proper remedy for breach of the implied
covenant of development is damages for the amount of royalty the lessor would have recovered had a reasonable prudent operator developed
the lease.' 56 The remedy of damages is generally considered to be inappropriate in exploration cases because of the inability to quantify the
damages. 57 At least two methods of quantifying damages in exploration cases have been proposed, neither of which appears to be
practicable.
152. Wright, supra note 34, at 712.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
154. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 841; Meycers and Williams, supra note
46, at 802.
155. Meyers, supra note 42, at 571; Weaver, supra note 6, at 1509.
156. R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 27, § 8.10 (recognizing the potential for "double recovery"
by a lessor).
157. See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 42, at 573.
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1. Lost Royalty
Damages could be based upon an amount equal to the royalty that
would have been realized from an exploratory well had it been drilled.
This is not an appropriate measure of damages because of its speculative nature; it is not possible to ascertain in advance with any degree of
certainty how much oil and gas, if any, will be produced from an exploratory well. 1 8 It has been suggested that the "expected value" test
discussed in the Texas Supreme Court's first opinion in Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Jackson19 may be an appropriate method to
calculate damages based upon lost royalty from an undrilled exploratory well, but this remedy is defective because the quantum of the
award is too speculative and uncertain. 8 0
2.

Lost Bonus

A second potential measure of damages would be an amount equal
to the bonus lost by the lessor due to his inability to execute a new
lease. This measure of damages has been criticized because it does not
redress the essential harm suffered by either the lessor or the public
interest. According to this criticism, the lessor has been most severely
harmed by the loss of royalty on his mineral deposits, and society has
been harmed by the removal of undeveloped lands from commerce."'
Neither is relieved by a measure of damages based upon the lost bonus.
C.

Cancellation

In some jurisdictions, the equitable remedy of cancellation is available where it is shown that a remedy in damages is inadequate. 62 For
example, in a case involving the implied covenant of development, the
Texas courts have stated:
The usual remedy for breach of the lessee's implied covenant for reasonable development of oil and gas is an action for damages, though,
under extraordinary circumstances-where there can be no other adequate relief-a court of equity will entertain an action to cancel the
lease in whole or in part. 6 '
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.; 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 12, at § 62.5.
31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 604 (July 13, 1988).
See Weaver, supra note 6, at 1508-09.
5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 844.3.
R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 27, § 8.11.
W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 518, 19 S.W.2d 27, 29
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Other states, including Arkansas, have utilized the remedy of cancellation for breach of an implied covenant without the necessity of first
pursuing a remedy in damages."" The basis for this remedy is either a
finding that the lessee has "abandoned" the leased premises, 115 or a
finding that the implied covenant is in effect a condition, the failure of
which will entitle the lessor to cancellation. 6 6 In such jurisdictions, the
remedy of cancellation is an equitable remedy and the court has flexibility to fashion a remedy that is appropriate to the circumstances.
Courts frequently grant partial cancellations, reserving to the lessee
those portions of the lease that he has in fact developed. 6 7 The partial
cancellation may be on a horizontal or vertical basis. 168
In Texas, the remedy of unconditional cancellation is not
available:
Under the decision in Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., [the remedy
of absolute cancellation] is regarded as unavailable in Texas. In a
proper case, cancellation of a lease may be decreed but the decree
must be conditional; that is, cancellation must be conditioned on the
refusal of the lessee to perform the covenant as directed by the
decree.' 69
Prior to the court of appeals' decision in Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Jackson,'7 0 there was no Texas appellate court decision upholding an unconditional cancellation of an oil and gas lease. The court
(1929). (The cancellation remedy referred to by the court is conditional cancellation, not an absolute cancellation.); see Lido Oil Co. v. W. T. Waggoner Estate, 31 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1930, writ ref'd). (Thlis case is W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co. on remand;
following the remand Sigler Oil Co. changed its name to Lido Oil Co.)
164. R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 27, § 8.11; Byrd v. Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d
366 (1983).
165. 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 12, at § 62.5; Wright, supra note 34, at 713.
166. R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 27, § 8.11; Wright, supra note 34, at 713; see Mansfield
Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 173-74, 133 S.W. 837, 840 (1911) ("This implied covenant is
in effect a condition upon which the lease was made; a failure or refusal to perform that condition
results in a forfeiture of the lease.").
167. 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 12, at § 62.5; Emanual, Remedies for Breaches of Implied
Covenants and Express Obligations to Drill in Oil and Gas Agreements, E. MIN. L. INST. §
16.06[5l[a]; see, e.g., Byrd v. Bradham, 280 Ark. 11,655 S.W.2d 366 (1983); Nolan v. Thomas,
228 Ark. 572, 309 S.W.2d 727 (1958).
168. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 844.2; see, e.g., Stevenson v. Barnes,
288 Ark. 147, 702 S.W.2d 787 (1986).
169. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, at § 845.6 (citing W. T. Waggoner Estate
v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929)).
170. 715 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App. --Houston [list Dist.] 1986), rev'd, 783 S.W.2d 202
(Tex. 1989).
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of appeals unaccountably cited as authority for the remedy of unconditional cancellation, two cases involving the remedy of conditional cancellation, both of which stated that the remedy of unconditional cancellation was not available in Texas.17 The granting of the remedy of
unconditional cancellation by the court of appeals in Sun Exploration
& Production Co. v. Jackson was not supported by Texas law and is
not authority for the remedy of unconditional cancellation in Texas.
D.

Conditional Cancellation

The remedy of conditional cancellation gives the lessee the opportunity to further explore the lease in order to prevent cancellafion. The
decree can be fashioned in a variety of ways. For example, the court
can order cancellation of the lease if the lessee does not commence operations within a fixed time period."7 2 Alternatively, the decree may
order outright cancellation as to a portion of the leased premises and
conditional cancellation as to other portions."7 3
Texas courts will recognize the remedy of conditional cancellation
in instances where damages are not ascertainable. A decree of conditional cancellation is not, however, to be simply fashioned from the
conscience of the court. It should follow from fact findings that a failure to develop has occurred and that a reasonable prudent operator
would have drilled a well ,or wells at specified locations to specified
depths. The remedy of conditional cancellation offers the lessee a
choice: the lessee may drill the well or wells that the fact finder determined that a reasonable prudent operator would have drilled, or the
lessee may elect not to take the risk the fact finder says a reasonable
prudent operator would have taken."' 4
E.

The Requirement of Notice
Whether or not notice and demand are a prerequisite to an action

171. Slaughter v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 660 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App--Amarillo 1983, no
writ); Wes-Tex Land Co. v. Simmons, 566 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.--Eastland 1978, writ rerd
n.r.e.).
172. See, e.g., Arkansas Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 281 Ark. 207, 662
S.W.2d 824 (1984).
173. 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 12, § 62.5.
174. W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929); Lido
Oil Co. v. W. T. Waggoner Estate, 31 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. -- Amarillo 1930, writ ref'd).
(This case is W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co. on remand; following the remand Sigler Oil
Co. changed its name to Lido Oil Co.)
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to enforce the implied covenant of exploration depends upon the relief
sought by the lessee and the terms of the oil and gas lease. 175 Gener-

ally, notice and demand are not required in an action for damages.176 A
lessee must generally give notice and demand if he is seeking cancellation of the lease. 1"7 Such notice may not be required, however, where
78
the lessee's breach is egregious or where a demand would be futile .
VIII.

17 9

EXPRESS LEASE PROVISIONS

As previously discussed, 8 the courts of both Texas and Arkansas
imply covenants in oil and gas leases in order to give effect to the presumed intent of the parties. One of the results of categorizing implied
covenants as implied in fact is that, absent fraud, express lease provisions generally supersede implied covenants on the same subject.''
An example of the effect of express lease provisions on implied
covenants is represented by Gulf Production Co. v. Kishi. 8 2 The lessors sued the lessee, alleging failure to develop the leased premises with
reasonable diligence. The two leases involved contained extensive provisions regarding the drilling of the initial exploratory well, the drilling of
additional test wells, and the drilling of additional development wells
after the discovery of production.
The lessors in Kishi argued that an implied covenant of development was implied into every lease, and that only a lease provision excusing the lessee from the exercise of reasonable diligence in developing
the premises could defeat the implied covenant. The court replied that
the implied covenant of development could be superseded by an express
175. See generally, 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 682.
176. R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 27, § 8.11.
177. Id.
178. 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 12, § 62.4; Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 231 Ark. 357, 329
S.W.2d 424 (1959); Byrd v. Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
179. The express lease provisions discussed in this article have been culled from various
cases and articles. The authors neither endorse nor recommend the use of any such general or
specific lease provisions.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
181. 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 245; Wright, supra note 34, at 715; see
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Page, 141 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. Civ. App. --San Antonio 1940, writ
ref'd) ("[W]hen expressed covenants appear in the lease, implied covenants disappear."); see also
Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 174, 133 S.W. 837, 840 (1911) ("It is true that
when such a lease expressly provides when and how the search for the minerals shall be made
upon the leased lands, then there can be no reason for implication relative thereto, and such
provision expressly made must control.").
182. 129 Tex. 487, 103 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1937).
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development plan: "The true rule is that the implied covenant arises
only out of necessity and in the absence of an express stipulation with
respect to development of the leased premises." 1 3
After reviewing the express lease provisions, the court held that
the implied covenant of development had been negated by the lease:
It is our opinion that the parties expressed, in the third paragraph of
the first lease and in the fourteenth paragraph of the second lease,
their agreements and intentions as to the number of wells required to
be drilled by the lessee in the development of the premises covered by
the two leases and as to the time when the wells should be drilled; in
other words, that these two paragraphs contain the agreements of the
parties upon the subject of development and the subject of diligence of
development. This being true, there is no necessity for the implication
of a covenant for development with reasonable diligence. To imply
such a covenant would be to make an agreement for the parties upon
a subject about which they have in their written contracts expressly
agreed.184
Although it has been stated that there can be no implied covenant
on any general matter that is the subject of an express covenant, the
view of some text writers is that an implied covenant will be superseded
only to the extent that it is inconsistent with the express provision. 8 '
There are at least six different types of express clauses that can be
drafted to supersede or revise the implied covenant of exploration.
A.

Delay Rental Clauses

The standard delay rental clause supersedes the implied covenant
of exploration for so long as delay rentals are tendered during the primary term.186 The rationale is that the lessee has bargained for the
right to hold the minerals without exploring for them during the primary term upon the tender of delay rentals.18 7 The tender of rentals is
a payment in lieu of exploration. 188 In general, "paid-up" leases have
also been held to supersede the implied covenant of exploration during
183. Id. at 492, 103 S.W.2d at 968.
184. Id. at 494-95, 103 S.W.2d at 969.
185. See, e.g., 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 12, § 62.2.
186. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 846; Bullock, supra note 10, at 145;
Meyers, supra note 7, at 116; Merrill, Lease Clauses Affecting Implied Covenants, 2 INST. ON OIL
AND GAS L. AND TAX'N 141, 150 (1951).
187. Meyers, supra note 7, at 116.
188. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 846.

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:25

the primary term. 18 9
The incompatibility of the delay rental clause and the implied covenant of exploration appears to be the majority rule, and is followed in
the state of Texas.1 90 A minority position, the so-called Indiana rule,
provides that a lessor may refuse payment of delay rentals and demand
exploration after reasonable notice. 9 '
The existence of the delay rental clause does not necessarily excuse the lessee from the obligations of exploration or development during the entirety of the primary term. If production is obtained during
the primary term, and the delay rental clause loses its efficacy, then. the
duties to explore and develop may arise.' 92
B.

Express Drilling Clauses

The lessor and lessee may provide for a predetermined plan of development. This can be achieved by means of a "continuous development" clause or by a clause that prescribes the number of wells to be
drilled.' These clauses have become popular in Texas as lessors and
lessees have become more sophisticated. Some text writers assert that
express drilling clauses have gained widespread use in Texas due to the
unavailability of the implied covenant of exploration and the difficulty
and expense of proving a breach of the implied covenant of
development. 9 "
A continuous development clause may provide that, after an initial
well is completed, the lessee shall drill additional wells, without a lapse
of more than a specified period of time between the completion of one
well and the commencement of the next well, until the premises are
fully explored or until a set number of wells are drilled. If the lessee
fails to continue drilling, the typical provision will provide for termination of the lease as to undeveloped acreage."'
The primary issue regarding express drilling clauses is whether the
clause sets forth the entire drilling obligation of the lessee, or whether
the clause merely sets forth the initial obligations of the lessee, leaving
189. Merrill, supra note 186 at 150; but see Malone, Problems Created by Express Lease
Clauses Affecting Implied Covenants, 2 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 133, 140 (1956).
190. Malone, supra note 189, at 140.
191. Id.; Bullock, supra note 10, at 145; Merrill, supra note 186, at 150.
192. Meyers, supra note 7, at 116.
193. 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 256; 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 12, § 62.2.
194. 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 256.
195. Id.
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further exploration to implication. 9 6 In such instances, the court must
examine the lease in its entirety and in light of the circumstances in
order to determine whether the parties intended obligations beyond
those set forth in the express provision."'
An example of an express drilling clause was set forth in Gulf
Production Co. v. Kishi: 98
Should oil in paying quantities be found on the leased premises, then
additional wells shall be drilled thereon until as many as four producing wells are drilled and such additional wells shall be drilled within
not more than 90 days interval between the completion or abandonment of one and commencement of work on another and a failure to
drill such wells shall terminate this lease as to all land except 5 acres
in a square around each producing well, with the well in the center.' 99
As previously discussed, 00 the express drilling clause in Kishi was held
to supersede the implied covenant of development.
A contrary result was reached by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson.2 0 Three of the
leases in Masterson collectively covered approximately 40,000 acres.
Each lease provided for the drilling of two wells on the leased premises.
In response to the lessor's claim that Sinclair had not adequately explored the leased premises, Sinclair argued, relying on Kishi, that the
express lease provisions negated the implied covenant of exploration.
The court rejected Sinclair's argument, stating:
It would put a hard strain upon one's sense of proportion to assume
that a landowner would be content with six wells on a little less than
forty thousand acres. A reading of the three leases involved here convinces us that the parties had no such intention, but were merely
speeding up the implied covenant of the lessees for reasonably diligent
exploration and development by setting a deadline for at least two
wells under each lease. 2
Professor Merrill set forth several express lease provisions in his
196. R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 27, § 8.4; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, §
846; Bullock, supra note 10, at 148.
197. Bullock, supra note 10, at 148-49.
198. 129 Tex. 487, 103 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1937).
199. Id. at 491, 103 S.W.2d at 967.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 182-84.
201. 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 952 (1960).
202. Id. at 323.
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including the following provision:

After the discovery of oil, gas or other mineral in paying quantities on
the land embraced by this lease, Lessee shall reasonably develop the
acreage retained hereunder, but in discharging this obligation, Lessee
shall in no event be required to drill more than one well per
acres of the area retained hereunder and capable of producing oil, gas
or other minerals in paying quantities." '
As a general rule, courts will strictly construe such provisions." 5
Courts are also reluctant to find that any one lease provision negates
more than one of the implied covenants.20 6
C.

07
Pugh Clauses

In certain states, a Pugh Clause can provide to a lessee an incentive to continue to explore the leased premises. Such a clause typically
provides that drilling operations on or production from a pooled unit or
units shall maintain the lease in force only as to lands included within
such unit or units.20 8 A typical Pugh Clause would provide as follows:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, drilling
operations on or production from the pooled unit or units established
by the Commissioner of Conservation embracing land covered hereby
and other land shall maintain this lease in force only as to the land
included in such unit or units, whether the operations be on the land
covered by this lease or on other lands in the unit. This lease may be
maintained in force as to the remainder of the land in any manner
herein provided for .

....

"I

A modified form of a Pugh Clause can be drafted providing that,
at the end of the primary term, the lease shall terminate as to all lands
except for a specified number of acres around producing wells.
203. Merrill, supra note 186.
204. Id. at 154.
205. 1 E. SMITH & J. WEAVER, supra note 6, at 259.
206. Malone, supra note 189, at 138; Merrill, supra note 186, at 157.
207. According to Williams & Meyers, the "Pugh Clause" is said to have been originated
in 1947 by Lawrence C. Pugh of Crowley, Louisiana and to take its name from him. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 43, at 788.
208. Id.
209. 4 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 669.14 (1986) (citing Fawvor v.
U.S. Oil of La., Inc., 162 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 1964), writ denied, 165 So. 2d 479 (1964).
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D. Clauses Describing the Circumstances in Which Exploration Must
Occur
Professor Kuntz cites the Texas case, Hancock v. Texaco, Inc., as
providing an example of a lease clause that describes the circumstances
in which further exploration may be required: 1 '
[S]hould commercial oil production be discovered on the Withers Pool
structure, Wharton County, Texas, within four thousand (4,000) feet
of said well in a new sand, at a greater depth than the sand horizons
now producing in said Withers Field, then and in that event lessee
hereby bind and obligate themselves, within one year from the date of
such discovery to prosecute the necessary drilling operations of a well
on said land to develop commercial oil production from such new or
deeper sand horizon, said well for the production of such new or
deeper production to be drilled and completed in such new or deeper
sand horizon only and at no shallower depth. Should lessee for any
reason make default in complying with the foregoing obligation to
drill said well to the new or deeper sand horizon, and shall fail to
remedy or correct such default . . . then and in that event lessee
hereby agrees that this lease shall be forfeited and surrendered in so
far only as such new or deeper sand horizon is concerned, and a release thereof shall be delivered by lessee to lessor.211
These clauses appear to be rare, possibly due to the difficulty in
anticipating all future circumstances that would lead a lessor to desire
further exploration and the unwillingness of the lessee to agree in advance to bear the cost of such operations. Also, the parties may simply
prefer to rely on established law and let future operations be determined by emerging facts.
E.

Good Faith or Discretion Clauses

A clause may be inserted into a lease that attempts to change the
standard of conduct by which the lessee's performance may be measured.2"' For example, in Texas, the standard of good faith may be
substituted for the standard of a reasonable prudent operator.
A clause of this type was discussed in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
210. 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 12, § 62.2 (citing Hancock v. Texaco, Inc., 520 S.W.2d 466
(Tex. Civ. App. -- Corpus Christi 1975, writ rerd n.r.e.)).
211. Hancock v. Texaco, Inc., 520 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. Civ. App. -- Corpus Christi 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
212. Merrill, supra note 186, at 188; see also R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 27, § 8.4.
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Page.1 The lessors sued to recover damages for failure of the lessee to
prevent drainage and to develop the leased premises. The lease contained a provision that stated: "The judgment of the lessee, when not
fraudulently exercised, in carrying out the purposes of this lease shall
be conclusive. '1 4 The court held that before the lessors could recover
from the lessee, the lessors would have to prove that the lessee's decisions not to drill an offset well to protect the leasehold against drainage
and not to further develop the leased premises were made "fraudulently, or at least in bad faith."2 5
A similar result was reached in Labbe v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co.2" The lease at issue contained the same provision as the lease in
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Page:2 "The judgment of the lessee, when
not fraudulently exercised, in carrying out the purposes of this lease
shall be conclusive. 21 8 In the absence of this provision, the court stated
that "there would be an implied covenant requiring the lessee after the
discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities, to use such diligence in
drilling and developing the lease for oil and gas as a reasonably prudent operator would under the same or similar circumstances."'2 9 In
light of the express provision, however, the court held that "the lessee
would not be required to further develop the lease unless lessee in making a decision not to do so acted fraudulently or at least in bad
faith. 2 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated: "The obligation
of a lessee to develop as a reasonably prudent operator may be relieved
by contract."' 22' The court also addressed and rejected the contention
222
that the express provision was contrary to public policy.
Another type of lease clause may be drafted in order to alter the
profitability element of the reasonable prudent operator standard:
In recognition of the fact that lessee has paid lessor bonus calculated
on the premise that lessee shall endeavor throughout to maximize its
213. 141 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. -- San Antonio 1940, writ rerd).
214. Id. at 693 (citing the lease).
215. Id.
216. 350 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. -- San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
217. 141 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. -- San Antonio 1940, writ rerd).
218. Labbe v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 350 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Civ. App. -- San
Antonio 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing the lease).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 875; see also Bullock, supra note 10, at 145.
222. Labbe v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 350 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Civ. App. -- San
Antonio 1961, writ refd n.r.e.); see also, Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir.
1905) (establishing the reasonable prudent operator standard).
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profits from this lease, and from the field in which the leased tract is
located, the parties hereby agree that under each and every covenant
that may be implied under this lease, the lessee shall never be obligated to drill any well or perform any other act unless such drilling or
other act will tend to maximize lessee's profits under this lease and
from the field in which the leased tract is located. 2
The continuing viability of these clauses has been questioned on
the grounds that such clauses are relatively innocuous and can be inserted into lengthy lease forms where they may be overlooked by a lessor.22 It is fundamental, however, that parties should understand their
agreements and be held to them; courts should not rewrite contracts
entered into by parties in their free will.
F.

Clauses Expressly Disclaiming Implied Covenants

Professor Meyers, the leading advocate of the implied covenant of
exploration, has suggested that the implied covenant of exploration
could be negated by the following lease provision: "[Aifter discovery
and production of oil or gas on the premises, lessee shall have no duty
to drill any additional well on the leasehold for the purpose of extending the limits of the existing field, or to explore either laterally or
vertically for additional producing formations." '2 5
Two other, commentators have cited the following provision as an
annulment of implied covenants in general: "This agreement covers the
entire understanding of the parties. There are no oral agreements,
promises or representations inconsistent with or supplementary to the
agreement herein expressed." 22' 6
IX.

CONCLUSION

Under the traditional definition of the implied covenant of exploration, the covenant would impose upon a lessee, after obtaining production in paying quantities from a leasehold, the obligation to explore
undeveloped portions of the leasehold, both vertically and laterally, for
new, potentially productive formations. In order to prove breach of the
covenant, a lessor would prove that, under the circumstances, a reason223.

Williams, Implied Covenants' Threat to the Value of Oil and Gas Reserves, 37 INST.
3-1, 3-20 (1985).
Merrill, supra note 186, at 188.
Meyers, supra note 7, at 118.
Merrill, supra note 186, at 148; Bullock, supra note 10, at 144.
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able prudent operator would have drilled an additional well or wells.
This burden of proof could be met by a combination of factors, including the length of time that has expired without drilling, minimal drilling activity in comparison to the size of the tract, and lack of intent by
the lessee to further explore.
The implied covenant of exploration has not received uniform
treatment by the coutts of the various hydrocarbon-producing states. In
Texas, the supreme court has stated that there is no implied covenant
of exploration independent from the implied covenant of development.
The Arkansas courts have similarly refused to recognize the implied covenant of exploration separate from the implied covenant of development. The implied covenant of development appears to be defined
so broadly in Arkansas, however, that a lessor will be entitled to the
full protections of the traditional implied covenant of exploration under
the implied covenant of development. Under the Arkansas formulation
of the implied covenant of development, a lessor need not prove that
there is a reasonable expectation of profit to the lessor and lessee from
the drilling of any additional well. Instead, the lessor must prove that,
given the circumstances, the lessee acted unreasonably in failing to drill
an additional well. Lessors who meet this burden of proof are entitled
to cancellation or conditional cancellation of the lease.
The difference between the Texas and Arkansas rules lies in the
different formulations of the reasonable prudent operator standard used
by the courts in implied covenant of development cases. The Texas
courts require evidence of a reasonable expectation of profit to the lessor and lessee from any additional well, but the Arkansas courts do not
have such a requirement. Both rules are criticized: the Texas rule being
regarded as too favorable to the lessee and the Arkansas rule being
regarded as too favorable to the lessor. These criticisms should be tempered, however, by the fact that, as of this date, the law in both Texas
and Arkansas is well settled. It is not the function of the courts to
rewrite agreements or to alter longstanding rules of property, especially
in the field of oil and gas jurisprudence where millions of dollars are
expended through exploration operations, loans, purchases, and other
investments on the belief that the courts will continue to apply established law on a consistent basis.

